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I. INTRODUCTION 
Towards the end of a long and successful career in business, a wealthy 
individual built an expensive yacht, which he planned to use to sail around 
the world.1 Before he could sail the yacht, he had to take one crucial step: 
obtain insurance. He went to a brokerage firm, who he hired to find an 
insurance plan for the vessel.2 The brokerage firm found a plan, and the 
owner went on his dream sailing trip. He embarked off the Eastern Seaboard, 
headed south and west through the Panama Canal, before eventually making 
his way up towards the Californian coast.3 Within a nautical mile of the dock 
in Southern California, the yacht scraped a bed of rocks underwater, 
damaging the vessel’s underside.4 The businessman knew that his insurance 
would not cover the full price of the yacht, but assumed that his plan would 
cover the full amount of any damages.5 Without consulting his broker or the 
insurer, he had the yacht revamped by a repair shop right near the dock.6 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law.  
 1  Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear LLC, No. 15cv630 BTM (BLM), 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58247, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2016). 
 2  Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1054 
(S.D. Cal. 2017). 
 3  Id.  
 4  Id. 
 5  Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58247, at *3. 
 6  Id. 
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Contrary to the owner’s beliefs, the yacht’s damage was slightly more 
severe than he originally thought, since the steel frame of the yacht was also 
damaged and would cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to fully repair.7 
The repair shop informed the owner that welding was required to fix the 
damage to the steel frame.8 During the welding process, the entire yacht 
caught fire and destroyed it beyond repair.9 Horrified, the owner sought 
consolation and contacted his insurance company, only to learn that his 
unintentional violation of the insurance agreement prevented a payout of his 
policy.10 Under the terms of his agreement, the businessman owner was 
required to notify the insurance company prior to any repairs payable by the 
policy, which he failed to do when he sought to repair the yacht’s frame.11 In 
an attempt to recoup his losses, the man turned to the court for justice, but 
summary judgment was granted for the insurer, since the businessman had 
clearly violated the policy’s notification requirement.12 Unable to recoup his 
losses from the insurance company, the businessman took action against the 
insurance brokerage who procured the policy on his behalf.13 
In his case against the insurance broker, the complainant-businessman 
argued for, among other things, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and negligence.14 Although the court granted the broker’s motions for 
summary judgment on the businessman’s claims for breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty and negligence claims, the court allowed his claims 
for heightened fiduciary and common law claims to continue.15 The 
heightened duties claim is a factual determination which requires it proceed 
to trial for a jury to decide.16 
This note will analyze the heightened duties of insurance brokers and 
when those heightened standards apply. Part I will address the role of 
insurance brokers and distinguish their relationship with the insurer from the 
insured clients. Part II will set out the nationally-recognized common law 
duties of brokers and provide brief examples of conduct that breaches those 
obligations. Part III will analyze the heightened duty standards in Florida, 
New York, and California to establish what circumstances have led courts to 
hold brokers to a heightened standard. Part IV will compare the Florida, New 
 
 7  Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1054. 
 8  Id. at 1055. 
 9  Id.  
 10  Id.  
 11  Id. at 1054.  
 12  Id. at 1063.  
 13  See generally Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1054. 
 14  See generally Bear, LLC v. Marsh USA, Inc., No. 15-cv-00630-BTM-BLM, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 68115, at *15 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2018). 
 15  Id. at 29. 
 16  Id.  
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York, and California’s standards, discussing the policy considerations that 
each state evaluates when examining the standard. Part IV will then propose 
a standard for when heightened duties should be imposed, suggesting that 
states adopt a standard similar to the heightened duties enforced in 
California. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Insurance brokers play an important role in the insurance industry. 
Brokers function as intermediaries, connecting commercial and wealthy 
individual clients with insurance companies.17 Insurance brokers are not 
insurance agents. Insurance agents are paid employees of the insurer, 
whereas brokers are not employees of either the insurer or insured.18 This 
note will focus on the role and duties of insurance brokers. 
Insurance brokers are often regarded as agents of the insured party in 
an agency context, but this is not always the case.19 The agency relationship 
stems from the insured client-principal requests for the broker-agent to find 
specific insurance coverage, which the broker-agent obtains on the client’s 
behalf.20 This principal-agent relationship is automatically created when the 
insured client requests the services of the broker.21 Unlike typical principal-
agent relationships, insurance brokers can have a “dual-agency” role.22 In 
this role, insurance brokers can be agents for both the insured client as well 
as the insurer-client.23 Under normal circumstances, this would create a 
conflict of interest. However, in the insurance broker context, the insured 
and insurer-clients’ respective interests are not in conflict.24 
Principal-agent relationships provide the principal with a level of 
control over the agent in certain matters.25 When insurance brokers are 
agents of the insured, the latter “controls the broker in placing coverage with 
insurer.”26 On the other hand, when insurance brokers are agents of an 
 
 17  Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 
6–7 (2004). 
 18  ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 254 (3d ed. 2002). 
 19  See DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS 126 (1995) (stating that absent contrary agreement, “an agent may not act for 
anyone whose interests might conflict with the interests of the principal,” and describing this 
as a “duty of undivided loyalty”); HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW 
OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 127 (2d ed. 1990) (“It is the duty of an agent to act solely and 
completely for the benefit of his principal.”). 
 20  Jerry, II, supra note 18. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id.  
 23  Id.  
 24  Id.  
 25  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958). 
 26  Richmond, supra note 17, at 6–7 (citing Jerry, II, supra note 18).  
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insurer, the insurer controls the broker “in collecting premiums.”27 These two 
aspects of an agent’s duties do not conflict.28 It is important to note that the 
insured client can expressly or impliedly permit the broker to be a dual-agent 
for the insurer. but only with express, contractual agreement from the 
insurer.29 The insurer-client’s relationship to the broker is not automatically 
a principal-agent relationship.30 This is because the insured party should 
know that the broker is responsible for collecting premiums, since it pays its 
premiums to the broker rather than directly to the insurer.31 However, the 
insurer should know the extent of the broker’s relationship with secured 
clients and the possibility that the broker will be representing the insured-
client’s interests beyond simply procuring coverage before authorizing a 
dual-agency.32 
In the Polar Bear case, the owner of the yacht had the boat appraised 
by marine surveyors independent of the broker.33 Subsequently, the owner 
hired the insurance brokerage firm to obtain insurance coverage.34 Hiring the 
brokerage firm formed the principal-agent relationship between the two 
parties, and the insurance broker sought out coverage from various insurers 
and presented its findings to the principal.35 In this case, though irrelevant, 
none of the parties engaged in dual-agency. The broker, now the agent for 
the insured client-principal, had duties and responsibilities that he owed to 
the client under the agency relationship between the two parties. 
III. AN INSURANCE BROKER’S COMMON LAW DUTIES 
Insurance brokers owe common law duties to the insured client through 
the contractual and agency relationships between the two parties.36 There are 
generally four claims that an insured client can bring against an insurance 
broker in violation of these duties: (1) negligence (in tort), (2) breach of 
contract, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, and (4) breach of heightened duties.37 
This section will cover the first three claims, and how insured clients bring 
 
 27  Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29  See Kleinberger, supra note 19 (stating that absent contrary agreement, “an agent may 
not act for anyone whose interests might conflict with the interests of the principal,” and 
describing this as a “duty of undivided loyalty”); Reuschlein &  Gregory, supra note 19 (“It 
is the duty of an agent to act solely and completely for the benefit of his principal.”). 
 30  See Kleinberger, supra note 19.  
 31  Id.  
 32  Id.  
 33  Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1054 
(S.D. Cal. 2017). 
 34  Id.  
 35  Id. 
 36  Richmond, supra note 17, at 1. 
 37  Id. 
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such claims against insurance brokers who fail to live up to their duties. 
Negligence is the most common tort claim against insurance brokers.38 
To establish negligence, an insured client must establish that: (1) the broker 
owed a duty to the insured client; (2) said duty was breached by the broker; 
(3) the broker’s breach of duty was the proximate to the insured client’s 
damages; and (4) the insured client was harmed as a result of the broker’s 
breach.39 These are the typical common law elements of negligence that can 
serve as a basis for a claim, regardless of a contractual relationship between 
the broker and the client.40 
However, in the insurance broker context, the common law claim of 
negligence in tort arises from a contractual duty between the broker and the 
insured client.41 To prove breach of contract, the insured client must show 
that: (1) a contract, either oral or written, existed between the parties; (2) the 
insurance broker materially breached the contract; and (3) the insured client 
was damaged as a result of the insurance broker’s breach.42 Insurance 
brokers are found negligent “[w]here an insurance agent or broker 
undertakes to obtain insurance coverage for another person and fails to do 
so” and “may be held liable for resulting damages to that person for breach 
of contract or negligence.”43 In other words, if a broker contracts with a client 
to obtain the requested insurance coverage and fails to do so, he will be found 
negligent and in breach of contract.44 Negligence and breach of contract are 
two separate claims; however, many claimants argue to prove these claims 
overlap. 
To meet the duties owed to their clients, insurance brokers must “act 
with reasonable care, skill, and diligence.”45 This standard is recognized 
universally, requiring the broker to “exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances,” or, as articulated by Wyoming courts, “general duty to act 
reasonably towards the insured.”46 This means that “insurance agents have a 
common law duty to obtain requested coverage for their clients within a 
reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to do so; however, they 
have no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct a client to obtain additional 
coverage.”47 Whether a broker has advised a client in a reasonable amount 
 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id.  
 40  Wachovia Ins. Servs. v. Toomey, 994 So. 2d 980, 990 (Fla. 2008).  
 41  Romo v. Amedex Ins. Co., 930 So. 2d 643, 654 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. (citing Klonis v. Armstrong, 436 So. 2d 213, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)).  
 44  Bennett v. Berk, 400 So. 2d. 484, 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
 45  See e.g., Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 281 (Ct. App. 1996).  
 46  Bichelmeyer Meats v. Atl. Ins. Co., 42 P.3d 1191, 1196 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001); Gordon 
v. Spectrum, Inc., 981 P.2d 488, 492 (Wyo. 1999).  
 47  Am. Bldg. Supply Corp. v. Petrocelli Group, Inc., 19 N.Y.3d 730, 735 (2012).  
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of time is a fact-sensitive inquiry, and must be examined in light relevant 
industry standards.48 If a broker is unable to secure coverage for his client, 
that broker  must inform the client in reasonable amount of  time to allow the 
insured client to seek coverage elsewhere.49 Additionally, brokers have a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing that require them to secure policies that 
are not “materially deficient” and to accurately represent their clients.50 
Insured clients have a duty to request specific coverage and read the 
policy provided to them by the insurance broker.51 Central to the common 
law duties of brokers is the broker’s responsibility to procure a policy that 
covers everything that the insured client has explicitly requested.52 On the 
other side, the insured client must request specific coverage, since “a general 
request for coverage will not satisfy the requirement of a specific request for 
a certain type of coverage.”53 Without knowing the client’s specific coverage 
needs, a broker will not be held liable for inadequate coverage: “a request 
for ‘full coverage,’ ‘the best policy,’ or similar expressions does not place an 
insurance [broker] under a duty to determine the insured’s full insurance 
needs, to advise the insured about coverage, or to use his discretion and 
expertise to determine what coverage the insured should purchase.”54 The 
reason for specific coverage requests is rooted in the idea that: 
[I]nsureds are in a better position to know their personal assets and 
abilities to protect themselves more so than general insurance 
agents or brokers, unless the latter are informed, asked to advise 
and act . . . . Furthermore, permitting insureds to add such parties 
to the liability chain might well open flood gates to even more 
complicated and undesirable litigation.55 
Generally, a broker’s duties to an insured client end when the broker 
delivers the policy.56 Because a broker has no duty to advise an insured client 
on the adequacy of his or her coverage, it is necessary for insured clients to 
read and understand the policies prior to delivery.57 Thus, “the relationship 
between broker and insured . . . is an ordinary commercial one.”58 “Various 
 
 48  Id. 
 49  Id. 
 50  Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 280 (Ct. App. 1996) (imposing 
liability on agent who failed to procure level of coverage demanded by insured before insured 
agreed to purchase policy).  
 51  Am. Bldg, 19 N.Y.3d at 736. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id.  
 54  Trotter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 377 S.E.2d 343, 347 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988).  
 55  Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 273 (N.Y. 1997).  
 56  See generally Faulkner v. Gilmore, 251 Ill. App. 3d 34, 39 (1993). 
 57  Id. at 36. 
 58  Am. Bldg. Supply Corp. v. Petrocelli Group, Inc., 19 N.Y.3d 730, 737 (2012) (Pigott, 
J., dissenting).  
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appellate courts have held that once an insured has received his or her policy, 
he or she is presumed to have read and understood it and cannot rely on the 
broker’s word that the policy covers what is requested.”59 This reasoning 
goes to the basic principle of contract law; barring any coercion, 
misrepresentations, or any other violations of equitable principles, parties are 
free to contract with whomever they wish, regardless of their relationship to 
the other.60 Once the insured receives his or her coverage, the broker’s only 
remaining duty is to give timely notice of the policy’s end date, insuring the 
client avoids any gap in coverage.61 The broker is under no implied duty to 
renew the policy on behalf of the client unless the broker and client agreed 
to it in the contract.62 
The common law duties in tort and contract law require the broker do 
his job professionally.63 In the insurance broker context, some courts have 
found breach of contract and negligence to be separate claims, with the duty 
element for negligence arising out of the contractual agreement between 
broker and client.64 Other courts recognize breach of contract and negligence 
as separate claims, with the duty element for negligence arising out of an 
“extra-contractual duty.”65 In either case, negligence and breach of contract 
are interrelated claims; it is unlikely that any court would find a broker 
negligent without also finding that the broker breached the respective 
contract.66 It is unlikely that any court would find a broker negligent without 
also finding the broker breached the respective contract, since the contract 
between the insurance broker and the insured client is meant to procure the 
specific insurance requested.67 If the broker breaches his duties, by failing to 
either obtain proper insurance for the client, inform the client of inability to 
obtain coverage, or by procuring the wrong type or level of coverage, the 
insurance broker has both breached his contract with the insured and acted 
 
 59  Id. at 736.  
 60  Id. at 737 (Piggott, J., dissenting).  
 61  See generally Faulkner, 251 Ill. App. 3d 34, 38–39 (holding what duties a broker owes 
a client within a Mastery Surety Agreement). 
 62  Id.  
 63  Id. 
 64  See, e.g., Wachovia Ins. Servs. v. Toomey, 994 So. 2nd 980, 1000 (Fla. 2008) (Lewis, 
J., dissenting in part).  
 65  SMI Owen Steel Co. v. Marsh USA, Inc., 520 F.3d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The 
Nevada Supreme Court stated that insurance brokers are ‘not obligated to assume the duty of 
procuring . . . insurance, but when they [do] so the law impose[s] upon them the duty of 
performance in the exercise of ordinary care for the rights and interests of the [intended 
purchasers].”). 
 66  Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear, LLC, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1277–
81 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (relying on its determination of the breach of contract claim when 
deciding the negligence claim).  
 67  Id. 
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negligently.68 If the broker successfully obtains the specific coverage, he is 
in compliance compliant with his contractual obligations and the insured 
party has no claim of negligence unless the parties have contracted beyond 
just procuring a policy and acted with care.69 The Polar Bear case is 
illustrative of this point, since the court relies on factual determinations made 
in consideration of the breach of contract claim against the broker to 
determine the negligence claim.70 
IV. A STATE PRESCRIBED FIDUCIARY DUTY 
In some states, insurance brokers owe a fiduciary duty to their insured 
clients as a result of the principal/agent relationship between the parties.71 
This section will focus on the California, New York and Florida approaches 
in determining whether or not insurance brokers owe a fiduciary duty and 
the courts’ reasoning under each approach. 
A fiduciary duty, also referred to as the duty of loyalty, is central to a 
principal/agent relationship. However, insurance brokers have unique 
circumstances that have put the nature of the fiduciary duty, and its very 
existence, into question.72 Fiduciary duties in the insurance broker context 
do not always exist. Courts that recognize a fiduciary duty do so as a matter 
of law, whereas courts that do not find a fiduciary duty look for a heightened 
duty based on specific circumstances.73 
Insurance brokers pose unique challenges for courts because of the 
potential dual-agency relationship between insured and insurer, and the 
policy considerations of assigning heightened duties to brokers.74 Typically, 
agents have a fiduciary obligation to their principal and, “[u]nless otherwise 
agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the 
benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency .”75 To prove 
a breach of fiduciary duty by a broker, the insured client must show: (1) a 
 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. at 1278. (“As already discussed above, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Marsh 
obtained the requested coverage for $17 million, and adequately informed and explained to 
Bear the terms and conditions of the policy. Therefore, as a matter of law, it did not breach its 
duty of reasonable care . . .”) (holding the broker not negligent but in breach of contract when 
the broker and client contracted for more than just procuring policy, such as automatic 
renewal, expert opinions, etc.).  
 71  Id. (“Under Florida law, an insurance broker has a fiduciary relationship with the 
insured that requires the broker to inform and explain the coverage it has secured at the client’s 
directions.”). 
 72  Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1278.  
 73  Id. at 1281.  
 74  See generally Farmers Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 871 S.W.2d 82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); see 
also Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266 (N.Y. 1997). 
 75  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (2010). 
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fiduciary duty exists between the broker and the client, (2) the broker 
breached his fiduciary duty, and (3) the broker’s breach of his fiduciary duty 
was the proximate cause of the insured client’s harm.76 The first element, 
whether a fiduciary duty exists, depends upon the relationship of the parties. 
Certain relationships give rise to fiduciary duties.77 The principal/agent 
relationship is a type of relationship where, as a matter of law, the agent owes 
its principal a fiduciary duty.78 Courts’ methodologies in determining 
whether the insurance broker’s relationship to his client is an agency 
relationship is determinative of the duties owed by brokers.79 The analysis 
rests on whether the court considers the insurance broker/client relationship 
to be a principal/agent relationship. 
California, New York, and Florida courts vary on their classification of 
the insurance broker’s relationship, and duties he or she owes, to insured 
clients beyond those in tort and contract. For this analysis, the following 
definition of agency is important: “the relationship which results from the 
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on 
his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”80 
In Wachovia v. Toomey, the Florida Supreme Court, articulated that an 
insurance broker owes its clients a fiduciary duty by operation of law.81 Thus, 
courts in Florida recognize the agency relationship between broker and 
insured client and assert that, “failing to adequately explain to [the client that 
the] insurance policy,” “failing to obtain proper approval from [the client to 
make changes],” and “failing to advise [the client] about the impact of the 
proposed [changes]” would be a breach of the fiduciary duty.82 In the Polar 
Bear case, also decided under Florida law, the court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the broker because he was able to show he had fulfilled 
his fiduciary duty by explaining a particular clause  to the client multiple 
times.83 Therefore, the duty of a broker to advise the insured as a fiduciary 
agent does not suggest advising on the merits of the insurance policy; but 
instead, the duty to advise requires the broker to explain the provisions in a 
way that allows the client can make an informed decision on whether or not 
to accept the policy.84 
 
 76  See Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 259 F. Supp. 3d at 1276–78.  
 77  Rash v. J.V. Intermediate, Ltd., 498 F. 3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2007).  
 78  Id. (citing Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002)). 
 79  Id. 
 80  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (2010). 
 81  Wachovia Ins. Servs. v. Toomey, 994 So. 2d 980, 984 (Fla. 2008). 
 82  Id. 
 83  Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Bear, LLC, 260 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1280 
(S.D. Cal. 2017).  
 84  Id. (“Ordinarily, an insurance broker has no duty to advise an insured as to the 
insured’s coverage needs.”). 
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In Tiara Condominium v. Marsh, the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida recognized a duty more extensive than the 
fiduciary duty of “advis[ing] and recommend[ing]” the client when a special 
relationship is formed.85  This court used several factors to determine when 
the duty to advise and recommend is triggered, specifically listing: 
(1) representations by the broker about its expertise; (2) 
representations by the broker about the breadth of coverage 
obtained; (3) the length and depth of the relationship; (4) the 
extent of the broker’s involvement in the client’s decision making 
about its insurance needs; (5) information volunteered by the 
broker about the client’s insurance needs; and (6) payment of 
additional compensation for advisory services.86 
A lawyer can be sued for malpractice if the lawyer does not explain the 
law adequately, but he can not be found guilty if he explained the law 
sufficiently to a client who ultimately made a poor determination. Similarly, 
a broker will breach his fiduciary duty if he fails to explain the policies he 
procures, but he will not be in breach if he explains the policies properly and 
the client makes an unsatisfactory decision. Thus, Florida has imposed three 
levels of duties that insurance brokers owe their insured-clients: (1) a 
common law duty, (2) a fiduciary duty and, (3) a heightened duty.87 
In Cathy Daniels v. Weingast, the Appellate Division of New York 
stated that “in the absence of a special relationship, a claim against an 
insurance broker for breach of fiduciary duty does not lie . . . Here, the 
[allegations in the] complaint do not establish anything more than a typical 
insurance [broker]-customer relationship.”88 The Bruckmann case further 
solidifies this point, asserting “the law is reasonably settled . . .  that 
insurance agents have a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage for 
their clients within a reasonable time or inform the client of the inability to 
do so; however, they have no continuing duty to advise, guide or direct a 
client to obtain additional coverage.”89 Under New York case law, there are 
three factual circumstances that can give rise to a special relationship 
between insurance broker and insured client: 
(1) the agent receives compensation for consultation apart from 
 
 85  Id. (citing Tiara Condo. Ass’n. v. Marsh, USA Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1280 (S.D. 
Fla. 2014)). 
 86  Id. at 1280–81 (citing Tiara, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1280).  
 87  Id. at 1280. 
 88  Cathy Daniels, Ltd. v Weingast, 91 A.D.3d 431, 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (citing 
Bruckmann, Rosser, Sherrill & Co. v. Marsh USA, 65 A.D.3d 865, 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008); People v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 52 A.D.3d 378, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)); See 
generally Bruckmann, 65 A.D.3d at 865.  
 89  Bruckmann, 65 A.D.3d at 867 (quoting Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 270 (N.Y. 
1997)).  
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payment of the premiums; (2) there was some interaction 
regarding a question of coverage, with the insured relying on the 
expertise of the agent; or (3) there is a course of dealing over an 
extended period of time which would have put objectively 
reasonable insurance agents on notice that their advice was being 
sought and specially relied on.90 
Unlike those in Florida, New York courts do not prescribe a fiduciary 
duty from an insurance broker to its insured clients as a matter of law.91 
Instead, the existence of any heightened duty beyond common law tort and 
contract law is a factual determination, requiring insured clients to show a 
special relationship existed, establishing more extensive duties.92 New York, 
therefore, only has two levels of duties: (1) a common law duty and (2) a 
fiduciary duty.93 
California’s rulings on this issue have been more akin to those passed 
down by New York courts, with California’s courts showing a similar 
hesitatation to assign heightened duties to insurance brokers. In Kotlar v. 
Hartford, a California appellate court ruled that “the duty of a broker, by and 
large, is to use reasonable care, diligence and judgment in procuring the 
insurance requested by its client.”94 The court went on to further describe the 
relationship between broker and client as “wide of the mark” when compared 
to the attorney-client relationship.95 The role of lawyers to act as zealous 
advocates for their clients within the bounds of the law contrasts with a 
broker’s need to only use “reasonable care to represent his client.”96 In 
addition, the analogy is even weaker when the dual-agency nature of an 
insurance broker is taken into account, since it would not be acceptable for a 
lawyer to serve as a dual-agent to both parties in a transaction.97 California’s 
approach adheres strongly to the concept that a broker’s duty to its client 
normally ends once the policy is procured.98 
However, like in New York, California courts recognize certain factual 
circumstances that could lead to duties beyond reasonable care.99 For 
example, when “there is a request or inquiry by the insured for a particular 
type or extent of coverage, or the [broker] assumes an additional duty by 
 
 90  Voss v. Neth. Ins. Co., 8 N.E.3d 823, 828 (N.Y. 2014) (citing Murphy, 90 N.Y.2d at 
266).  
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Kotlar v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 246, 250 (Ct. App. 2000).  
 95  Id.  
 96  Id.  
 97  Id.  
 98  Id. at 250 (finding no reason to impose a duty on the broker to inform the insured that 
his policy was terminating due to non-payment of premiums).  
 99  Kotlar, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250.  
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either express agreement or by ‘holding himself out’ as having expertise in 
a given field of insurance being sought by the insured.”100 California, like 
New York, has only two levels of duties: (1) a common law duty and (2) a 
heightened fiduciary duty.101 
By holding the broker-client relationship to be an agency relationship, 
and thereby imposing an inherent fiduciary duty as a matter of law, Florida 
courts have made policy considerations in favor of policyholders.102 Florida 
courts go even further, however, establishing a duty beyond fiduciary that 
allows the insured client to demonstrate there is a special relationship 
between broker and client requiring brokers to advise and recommend.103 On 
the other hand, California and New York courts have not imposed this 
inherent fiduciary duty and require a fact-sensitive inquiry considering 
whether a special relationship exists, thereby taking a “pro-insurance broker” 
stance.104 
V. COMPARING CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK AND FLORIDA STANDARDS FOR 
FORMING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP OR FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Courts have an extremely difficult task in determining how high to set 
the bar for establishing a special relationship and holding brokers to 
heightened duties. This section will compare the thresholds set by each court, 
the policy considerations involved, and their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. As noted, courts in California, New York, and Florida all 
recognize certain factual circumstances that create duties beyond those 
proscribed in common law. 
California only considers an insurance broker to have breached his duty 
of care in obtaining an insurance policy for the insured in three instances: 
where (1) the broker misrepresented the nature, extent, or scope of the 
coverage that is being either offered or provided; (2) the insured client has 
asked for a “particular type or extent of coverage; or (3) the broker has taken 
on an additional duty either by express agreement or by presenting himself 
as an expert in the specific area of insurance  being requested.105 Although 
the court in Pacific Rim distinctly considered the factors separately, they can 
be examined interdependently.106 If a prospective insured client asks a broker 
for “a particular type or extent of coverage,” it is likely because “the broker 
 
 100  Pac. Rim Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Servs. West, Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 294, 297–98 (Ct. App. 2012), (citing Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 452 (Ct. 
App. 1997)).  
 101  Id. at 298.  
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. at 298–300.  
 104  See generally id. 
 105  Id. at 297–99. 
 106  Pac. Rim., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 297-99. 
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is holding himself out” as an expert in the related field.107 Where the broker 
is not “holding himself out” as an expert and a prospective client assumes 
the broker to be an expert without specifically inquiring, the client is taking 
a gamble.108 Objectors to this interpretation argue that a broker may “hold 
himself out,” to be an expert, where in reality he is not.109 However, this 
scenario is hard to imagine without an express statement, oral or written, of 
expertise. If the broker misleads the insured about his expertise, he assumes 
the additional duty and the court will find him liable for any breach of this 
duty.110 This is to say that none of the factors test dispositive; with courts 
instead considering the totality of circumstances. 
The contract theory of reliance is embedded in this test.111 The insured 
client must show he relied on the broker when he signed the insurance policy, 
and he had valid reason to rely on the broker. The test is only used to show 
a heightened duty exists; whether the broker breached this duty is an entirely 
separate question. Thus, finding an insurance broker in breach of his 
heightened fiduciary duty is an uphill battle for the insured client in 
California. 
New York courts’ prior decisions pose similar difficulties for insured 
clients. New York courts considers three circumstances that create a special 
fiduciary relationship between insurance broker and insured client.112 The 
first situation occurs when the broker was paid an additional amount on top 
of the premium he or she received for their consultation.113 The analysis of 
this factor requires an understanding between the broker and insured client 
that the broker is going beyond his ordinary duties and thus should be 
compensated accordingly.114 
The second instance occurs when there has been an interaction between 
the broker and client in which the client inquired about coverage and relied 
on the broker’s expertise.115 The second occurrence is not met when the 
insured simply shows that he or she asked a question and relied on the 
 
 107  Id. at 297. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id.  
 110   Id. at 297–203; see also Century Sur. Co. v. Crosby Ins., Inc., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115, 
119 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an insurance broker is not immune from fraud, regardless 
of other duties and the respective claims that arise from them. “The following elements must 
be pleaded to state a cause of action for fraud: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) 
knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to deceive and induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance on the 
misrepresentation; and (5) resulting damages.”).  
 111  Pac. Rim., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 297–203. 
 112  Voss v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 8 N.E.3d 823, 828 (N.Y. 2014) (citing Murphy v. Kuhn, 
90 N.Y.2d 266, 272–93 (N.Y. 1997). 
 113  Id.  
 114  Id. at 829. 
 115  Id. 
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answer.116 The broker’s manner and substance of his response are also 
relevant to this inquiry, with the court asserting that “the casual response, 
given informally, [will] not elevate an ordinary commercial relationship to 
one that would impose a duty to determine value and ensure full 
coverage.”117 This means that the broker must offer expert advice to the 
insured client, and the insured client must rely on said expert advice.118 If the 
insured does not heed the alleged expert advice, no fiduciary duty will be 
imposed.119 
The third occurrence considers whether a reasonable broker in the 
normal course of dealing would know that the insured client is relying on his 
advice.120 This third instance alone has several considerations; it must show: 
(1) a course of dealing, (2) over a long period of time, (3) events that would 
put the broker on notice that the insured client views him as an expert, (4) 
either through an express agreement or reliance on the broker’s expertise, 
and (5) that the insured client relief on the broker’s expertise in signing the 
policy.121 If an insured client is relying on the third instance to impose a 
fiduciary duty on the broker, proving a course of dealing over an extended 
period of time will be the simplest element to prove.122 However, the 
reasonableness standard implicit in the third situation is more difficult to 
establish. The standard requires the insured client to demonstrate multiple 
occasions in which he or she  requested expert advice from the broker, and 
multiple times where the client relied enough on this advice, giving notice to 
the broker that the insured client is relying on the broker’s expertise.123 All 
three circumstances have difficult burdens for the insured client to meet; in 
the words of the Voss court, “special relationships in the insurance brokerage 
context are the exception, not the norm.”124 
Though Florida courts have employed a fact-sensitive special 
relationship standard, it is nonetheless different from New York and 
California’s standards, emphasizing a pro-policyholder, anti-insurance 
broker stance.125 For example, Florida has six factors, many of which are not 
considered by California or New York courts.126 This makes it easier to 
establish a heightened duty. There are common factors, as well; however, 
 
 116  Id. 
 117  W. Joseph McPhillips, Inc. v. Ellis, 8 A.D.3d 782, 784 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id.  
 120  Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 829–30 (citing Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266 (N.Y. 1997)). 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id. 
 123  Id. 
 124  Id. at 830.  
 125  Id. 
 126  Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 829–30.  
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Florida recognizes the broker-client relationship as inherently that of 
principal-agent with a fiduciary duty to explain the procured policies.127 
Florida courts use the three factors in their analyses that are used by 
California and New York courts, as well as an additional three factors: 
(1) representations by the broker about its expertise; (2) 
representations by the broker about the breadth of coverage 
obtained; (3) the length and depth of the relationship; (4) the 
extent of the broker’s involvement in the client’s decision making 
about its insurance needs; (5) information volunteered by the 
broker about the client’s insurance needs; and (6) payment of 
additional compensation for advisory services.128 
California’s three factors are (1) whether the broker misrepresented the 
nature, extent, or scope of the coverage; (2) whether the client asked for a 
particular type or extent of coverage; and (3) whether the broker has 
expressly or impliedly taken on a heightened duty.129 New York’s three-
factor test considers whether the client has paid the broker an additional sum 
to the premium, whether the client requested the broker’s expertise, and 
whether the broker had reason to know that the client had relied on his 
expertise as a result of the length and breadth of his relationship with the 
client.130 Accordingly, Florida’s additional factors consider the brokers’ 
involvement in the client’s decision-making, the information volunteered by 
the broker, and the representations by the broker about the breadth of 
coverage obtained.131 These additional factors allow the insured clients to 
bring claims against insurance brokers in a wider set of circumstances. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
Florida’s three additional factors deviate from the deep-seeded policy 
position that the insured is in the best position to evaluate risk for his 
business. There are two main policy considerations that have prompted 
courts and state legislators  to impose a high threshold on finding that 
insurance brokers owe a heightened duty to their clients.132 First, “[i]mposing 
on intermediaries a general duty to advise insured about the adequacy and 
appropriateness of coverage insulates insureds from the burden of evaluating 
and caring for their own financial needs.”133 Second, creating a general duty 
 
 127  Id. 
 128  Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh, USA, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2014).  
 129  Pac. Rim Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Servs. West, Inc, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
294, 297–98 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 130  Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 829–30.  
 131  Tiara, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1281.  
 132  ROBERT H JERRY & DOUGLAS R RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 225 
(5th ed. 2012). 
 133  Id. 
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to advise allows insured parties to fill gaps in their policy after an uncovered 
loss has occurred and blame the broker for the lack of coverage.134 Placing 
such a duty on brokers “turns the entire theory of insurance on its ear as 
individuals, in theory, take an ‘intellectual gamble’ when purchasing 
insurance as they weigh the expense of insurance versus the amount of 
coverage that they purchase. Allowing insureds to seek coverage, post-
occurrence, allows them to completely circumvent this risk.”135 
In this section, the note will evaluate California’s, New York’s, and 
Florida’s standards against the backdrop of these overarching policy 
considerations. Specifically, it will argue in favor of California’s standards 
for brokers over both Florida and New York. 
California’s test, which only finds a heightened duty if the broker 
misleads, the insured makes a specific request for a particular extent of 
coverage, or if broker has expressly or impliedly held himself out to be an 
expert, should be adopted by every state’s judiciary. These requirements are 
consistent with the policy objectives because it keeps the task of risk 
assessment with the insured unless the broker agrees to serve as risk expert 
and advise the insured client.136 In this way, the broker is taking on a separate 
role not just as a broker, but also as a risk advisor.137 
Though California courts, under the right circumstances, have held 
brokers to have taken on this additional advisory role, they have only done 
so in very specific cases.138 For example, in Greenfield v. Insurance Inc., the 
California Court of Appeals found that when the insured client asked his 
broker for an “all-risk business interruption policy,” he or she made a 
specific request for particular coverage.139 However, the broker procured a 
policy that did not cover mechanical defects.140 Thus, the court held that the 
broker was liable based on negligence.141 In contrast, in Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, 
the insured asked whether the procured policy adequately covered his 
automobile.142 There, the court held that a general inquiry to the adequacy of 
the policy did not rise to the level of a specific request for particular 
coverage.143 Thus, the broker was not liable for the insured’s uncovered 
 
 134  Id.  
 135  Farmers Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 871 S.W.2d 82, 86 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).  
 136  David Martin, Christopher Hossellman & Seymour Everett, Broker, Advisor, or Both? 
When an Expanded Duty Will Be Imposed, 57 ORANGE COUNTY LAWYER 22 (2015).  
 137  Id.  
 138  Id. at 24. 
 139  Greenfield v. Ins., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 (Ct. App. 1971).  
 140  Id.  
 141  Id. at 168. 
 142  Fitzpatrick v. Hayes, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 447(Ct. App. 1997).  
 143  Id. at 453. 
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losses.144 These two cases highlight the high threshold California has for 
insureds to prove they made a specific request for particular coverage. 
California’s inquiry into whether the broker has expressly agreed to 
take on a risk advisory role or held himself out to be an expert, has focused 
on the latter.145 There is no sound argument against holding a broker liable 
if he has expressly agreed to be a risk advisor to the insured’s detriment.146 
However, when the broker has not expressly taken on this role, California 
courts have only found a broker to have “held himself out” to be an expert 
in very specific circumstances.147 For example, in Williams v. Hilb, when an 
insured party requested a meeting to discuss the type of coverage he needed 
for his business, the broker responded “[I am] the go-to person to take care 
of the insurance needs for Rhino Linings dealerships,” and “[I am] the expert 
on the product necessary to satisfy [Rhino SFS’s] insurance needs.”148 Here, 
the court ruled that the broker had assumed the advisory role as an expert to 
the insured’s detriment and was therefore liable.149 On the other hand, 
California courts have not held “conclusory allegations regarding alleged 
expertise are insufficient” to impose a heightened duty on the broker.150 
Specifically, the court held “[t]he mere allegation in a complaint, as in this 
case, that an insured has purchased insurance from an insurance [broker] for 
several years and followed his advice on certain insurance matters is 
insufficient to imply the existence of a greater duty.”151 The court in Jones 
rejected the idea that the length of the insured’s professional relationship 
with the broker was a relevant or decisive factor in finding a heightened 
duty.152 In this case, the broker had general financial information regarding 
the insured’s business, but the court held that the broker could not have 
reasonably known how much the insured was willing to pay for the premium 
or whether the financial information the broker had was the full extent of the 
insured’s assets.153 In concluding that the broker was not liable here, the court 
heavily relied on the abovementioned policy considerations.154 Similarly, in 
Wallman v. Suddock, the court found that mere allegations, or the subjective 
belief of the insured, that the broker held himself out to be an expert, were 
 
 144  Id. at 454. 
 145  Martin et al., supra note 136. 
 146  Id.  
 147  Id.  
 148  Williams v. Hilb, Rogal & Hobbs Ins. Servs. of Cal., Inc., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 910, 913 
(Ct. App. 2009).  
 149  Id. at 923.  
 150  Martin et al., supra note 136 at 24.  
 151  Jones v. Grewe, 234 Cal. Rptr. 717, 721 (Ct. App. 1987).  
 152  Id.  
 153  Id.  
 154  Id. at 721–22.  
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insufficient to find a heightened duty.155 Without an express agreement, 
California courts have been hesitant and strict in assigning a heightened duty 
for insurance brokers because the insured is in the best position to assess his 
risks and request the appropriate coverage. 
New York courts have taken a similar approach to California, except 
for the fact that they have an additional factor. New York’s first and second 
factors are identical to California’s first two factors.156 New York’s factor 
regarding an additional payment on top of the premium made to the broker 
is akin to California’s requirement of an express agreement to be an expert 
advisor. New York’s second factor which focuses on the insured asking a 
specific question and the broker in response providing expert advice is akin 
to California’s “holding himself out as an expert” factor.157 
New York courts, however, also consider the course of dealing and 
length of relationship to hold the broker to a heightened duty.158 It is 
important to note that New York has never found a broker liable under a 
heightened duty.159 New York courts thus far have only acknowledged that 
this circumstance has been considered by other jurisdictions and has merit.160 
New York courts rely on Trotter v. State Farm, wherein the South Carolina 
Court of Appeals held that doing business with the same company for eight 
years was insufficient to establish a heighted duty, barring any evidence that 
showed the broker should have known about the reliance.161 The insured’s 
reliance alone is not enough; the broker should be aware of the fact that the 
insured is relying on his expertise.162 Even though New York courts have 
recognized this avenue to hold the broker to a greater duty, the fact that the 
court has never found a heightened duty in this situation demonstrates the 
court’s reluctance to impose it.163 Regardless, New York courts should no 
longer recognize this third circumstance and adhere to the two analyses in 
common with that of California. The California approach is the most 
appropriate because as the New York Court of Appeals has upheld, 
“[i]nsurance agents or brokers are not personal financial counselors and risk 
managers, approaching guarantor status,” unless they have assumed such 
 
 155  Wallman v. Suddock, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 566, 585 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 156  Compare Voss v. Neth. Ins. Co., 8 N.E.3d 823, 828 (N.Y. 2014), with Pac. Rim Mech. 
Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Servs. West, Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 294, 297–98 (Ct. App. 
2012).  
 157  Compare Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 828, with Pac. Rim, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 297–-98. 
 158  See e.g., Voss, 8 N.E.3d at 828.  
 159  Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 269–71 (1997). 
 160  Id. at 975 (citing Trotter V. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 377 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 1988)).  
 161  Trotter, 377 S.E.2d at 343. 
 162  Id.  
 163  See e.g., 5 Awnings Plus, Inc. v. Moses Ins. Grp., Inc., 108 A.D.3d 1198 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013); Murphy, 90 N.Y.2d at 273.  
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responsibility expressly.164 
The three additional factors in Florida shift the risk assessment from 
the insured to the broker in more circumstances than is appropriate, which is 
contrary to the overarching policy objectives regarding the role and duty of 
insurance brokers. It is important to note that in Florida, finding a special 
relationship is a question of fact for the jury to decide.165 Thus, factors that 
the jury can consider should be limited. Florida’s additional factors, when 
considered by a jury, allow the insured the opportunity to escape his 
responsibility of risk and opens the door for claims against brokers that are 
unjustified. 
First, as an independent factor, the extent of the broker’s involvement 
in the client’s decision-making puts the broker between a rock and a hard 
place. Indeed, brokers should not be so clinical so that the insured simply 
asks for coverage and the broker procures it. Brokers should be build 
relationships with their insured clients, which naturally involves the broker 
in the client’s decision-making. However, without the broker’s express 
acquiescence to serve in an expert or advisory role, the client should be fully 
aware that he is in the best position to assess his own needs and make the 
final decision on the type of coverage he prefers. If the broker misrepresents 
or does not procure the coverage requested, he will be found liable under 
common law.166 
Second, the broker’s representations regarding the breadth of coverage 
should be more than casual remarks. Again, this factor is considered by a 
jury. Casual remarks such as “this policy is good” or “that is the best policy 
we could find,” could be taken as an expert opinion when in fact, they are 
not. Again, the client should know whether the policy is adequate to cover 
his risks. If the broker provides extremely specific and expert-like opinions 
on the breadth of coverage, the insured should inquire whether this is 
intended to be expert advice. In general, a client seeking insurance should be 
clear about the type of coverage he needs in addition to the type of 
relationship he has with the broker. 
Finally, information volunteered by the broker assumes the broker is an 
expert. If a broker volunteers information, the insured client may probe and 
inquire further, which may trigger a heightened duty. Volunteering 
information, without any follow up or further questioning by the insured, 
does not put the broker on notice that the client is relying on him as an expert, 
and allows the insured to substitute his own judgment and responsibility. 
Ultimately, the three additional factors used by Florida courts are broad 
 
 164  Murphy, 90 N.Y.2d at 273. 
 165  Tiara Condo. Ass’n v. Marsh, USA, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1282 (S.D. Fla. 2014).  
 166  Id. at 1280. 
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and unqualified. Florida’s approach provides the jury with broad discretion 
to find brokers liable, and causes the jury to assume the risk assessment role 
involuntarily. California and New York courts have fewer and more specific 
factors, which strictly adhere to leaving the financial and risk decision 
making with the insured, which is where it belongs. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It is apparent through recent case law across the country that 
California’s approach is the emerging trend.167 For example, Louisiana, a 
state that is traditionally hostile towards applying a narrow broker duty, 
recently held that an insurance broker owes no fiduciary duty to his clients.168 
Assigning broad duties to insurance brokers opens the floodgates for 
insureds to sue their brokers after a loss has occurred.169 Essentially, broad 
duties allow insureds to scapegoat their failures in assessing their own risks 
at the time they request coverage, either because they are not business-savvy 
or are trying to avoid paying high premiums for unlikely risks. When these 
risks manifest, assigning blame to a broker should not be an easy fix or a go-
to alternative for requesting adequate insurance to begin with. Insureds are 
in the best position to assess their risks and request the appropriate coverage. 
Therefore, the national trend should continue towards the Californian 




 167  Martin et al., supra note 139 at 24.  
 168  Isidore Newman Sch. v. J. Everett Eaves, Inc., 42 So. 3d 352; (La. 2013); see also 
Barreca v. Weiser, 53 So. 3d 481 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 169 Isidore Newman Sch., 42 So. 3d at 357–58.  
